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Medieval india from sultanat to the mughals - səhifə 6

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When Balban assumed power at Delhi as naib, he sent his slave, Yuzbek, as governor of Lakhnauti. Like his predecessors, Yuzbek also soon assumed airs of independence. Although he could not prevail against Orissa, he was successful in capturing Radha (1255). This success led to a change in his policy towards Delhi. He now assumed the title of a sultan, and the royal canopy. Taking advantage of trouble in Awadh where the governor had been ousted by Balban, Yuzbek advanced and captured Awadh, and had the khubah read in his name. But Yuzbek retreated on hearing rumors of an

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advance of Delhi armies on Awadh. Following this misadventure, Yuzbek made an attack on Kamrup. The local ruler retreated as far as he could, then turned against Yuzbek at the commencement of the rainy season. Cut off by the rising river water, Yuzbek suffered a disastrous defeat and was captured and put to death (1257).

Thus, successive Turkish officers sent from Delhi to Lakhnauti had assumed airs of independence. The worst proved to be the case of Tughril, a slave-officer, whom Balban now appointed governor of Lakhnauti. After consolidating his position, Tughril raided the territories of the ruler of Jajnagar, and amassed a lot of wealth and elephants which he refused to share with Delhi. He assumed the title of a sultan, and had the khubah read in his name.

News of Tughril's rebellion upset Balban greatly. He lost his sleep, feeling that events in Bengal would effect his position in Delhi. In 1276, Balban ordered the governor of Awadh, Amin Khan, to march along with his forces, and with the contingent of Hindustan to suppress the revolt. But in the engagement with Tughril many of Amin Khan's troops deserted as Tughril was lavish with money. When Amin Khan returned to Delhi, in anger Balban gibboted him and put his dead body on public display. Balban now appointed one of his chosen officers, Bahadur, to punish Tughril. But the result was the same. Bahadur fought bravely, but was defeated by Tughril. The Delhi army melted away, with many of the soldiers joining Tughril.

Thus, Balban was faced with an extremely serious situation. Two officers had been defeated, and Tughril was emerging as a rival to Balban. Balban, therefore, decided to personally lead a campaign against Tughril. To guard against all eventualities, he nominated his eldest son, Prince Muhammad, as his legal successor. However, the responsibility of runing the affairs at Delhi was given not to any Turkish noble, but to Fakhruddin, the kotwal of Delhi, with the post of naib. Balban took a second son, Bughra Khan, with him to Lakhnauti.

The campaign against Tughril took Balban two years (1280-82) because Tughril avoided a battle with him, retreating into the remote parts of Bengal with the hope that Balban would tire of the campaign and return. Balban relentlessly pursued Tughril till an advance guard of Balban's army surprised Tughril on a tip off from some banjaras, and killed Tughril. Balban gave savage punishment to the followers of Tughril at Lakhnauti. But when he returned to Delhi, he was dissuaded from making an example of those soldiers of Delhi who had deserted to Tughril. Perhaps, Balban's desire to

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maintain the solidarity of the Turks proved stronger. Bughra Khan was now appointed governor of the eastern part. However, it was Bughra Khan who, after the death of Balban, set up an independent dynasty which ruled Bengal for almost forty years.

iv. Assessment of Balban

The house established by Balban lasted only three years after his death. His son, Bughra Khan, preferred to rule at Lakhnauti, leaving the throne at Delhi to his son, Kaiqubad, a young man of eighteen. Kaiqubad proved to be an utter debauch, leaving all the affairs of state to Nizamuddin who tried to kill all the Turkish officers opposed to him. In the process, Nizamuddin himself was killed. The administration collapsed, and Jalaluddin Khalji who had been the warden of the marches and had distinguished himself in fighting against the Mongols, was called in to help. He soon got rid of Kaiqubad, and set up a new dynasty (1290).

Although Balban did not succeed in setting up a dynasty, by his stern enforcement of law and order within the upper doab or Indo-Gangetic plain which formed the essential part of his kingdom, sternly suppressing the lawless elements, and freeing the roads for the movement of goods and merchants, he created the necessary basis for the growth and future expansion of the sultanat. It might be noted that the Indo-Gangetic plain, extending upto Banaras and Jaunpur, was one of the most extensive and productive plain anywhere in the world, and its unification had been the essential basis of flourishing empires in the past.

Although there is no evidence that Balban made any systematic efforts to reorganise the system of administration, particularly at the local or provincial levels, his tight control over the iqtadars, with the barids informing him of all developments, imply that the revenues which were previously appropriated by the "Chihalgani" or Turkish slave-officers for their own use, now began to be made available to the central government. A part of these funds were used by Balban for setting up a highly ostentatious court, as we have noted, and the rest for strengthening the central army. Balban did not undertake any large scale building activity at Delhi or elsewhere. In fact, in the architectural field, his period of domination is almost a blank. Balban laid great emphasis on maintaining a large efficient army. He advised his son, Bughra Khan, that apart from the army half the income should be set aside as a safeguard against an emergency.

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It is difficult to estimate the efficiency of Balban's army since it was not engaged in any expansionist activities due to the fear of the Mongols. Balban did manage to contain the Mongols at the Multan-Dipalpur-Sunam line along the river Beas. But he was not able to push back the Mongols from the tract beyond Lahore, although he was faced only with second rank Mongol commanders, the attention of the Mongol rulers being concentrated on Iran, Iraq, Syria etc. Thus, it can be argued that there was no real threat to Delhi from the Mongols. However, Balban obviously could not take any chances.

More serious was the failure of Balban to control Tughril's rebellion in Bengal for six long years. The failure of two senior Turkish officers—Amir Khan, the governor of Awadh, and Bahadur, and many of their soldiers deserting to Tughril, suggests that there was growing dissatisfaction with Balban's management of affairs and his policies. The Turkish soldiers were never satisfied with their salaries, but expected to supplement these with plunder (ghanim). Balban's policy of consolidation provided them no such opportunity. The rebellion of Turkish officers in Sindh and, even more significantly, the attempt of two of Balban's own slaves, Yuzbek and Tughril, to become independent in Lakhnauti shows that even Balban's sternness could not put down the innate Turkish tribal desire for independence. Although Balban did finally break the power of the Turkish Chihalgani, his resort to a policy of poison and secret assassination of many Turkish nobles, and his exaggerated emphasis on family and ancestry rather than efficiency and ability were counter-productive. The latter not only prevented competent Indians to be appointed or rise in the service of the state, but it seems adversely effected even Turks of humble origin.

Nevertheless, Balban's achievements were greater than his limitations. He built a polity which was capable not only of sustaining itself, but had the capacity to embark on a policy of expansion as soon as the narrow constraints he had put on it were broken, and men of proven worth and efficiency were pushed forward. This was the task which he bequeathed to his successors.

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4 THE MONGOL THREAT TO INDIA DURING THE 13TH-14TH CENTURIES

Although India was defended in the North and the North-West by a range of mountains, the Himalayas and their extension, the low mountains in the North-West were pierced by passes which were the traditional points of entry into India. Of these passes, the most well-known, and the most frequently used, were the Khybar and the Bolan passes. A more natural line of defence for India than these low mountains in the north-west was provided by the Hindukush mountains, which were a fairly effective barrier between Afghanistan and Central Asia in the north, while the Iranian desert provided an effective shield on the west. Afghanistan and its neighbouring areas were strategically important for India because they provided a staging centre for any invasion of India. Thus, as we have seen, attack on Afghanistan was the first stage in the Ghaznavid and Ghurian conquest of north India.

i. The Mongol Incursions (upto 1292)

After the Ghurian conquest, it might have been expected that Ghur and Chazni would provide an effective shield against any future invasions of India. But the separation of India from Ghur and Ghazni, and the subsequent conquest of the area by Khwarizm Shah, followed by the Mongols, completely altered the strategic position. A viable defence line in the north-west could now be provided either by the Indus, or by the Koh-i-Jud (Salt Ranges) which was on this side of the Indus. We shall trace the stages by which the Mongols breached these lines of defence in course of time, and reached upto the river Beas, thereby posing a serious threat to the sultanat of Delhi.

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We have seen how in 1221, Chingez loitered around the Indus for three months, after defeating the Khwarizmi prince, Jalaluddin Mangbarani. Crossing the Indus, the prince had formed an alliance with the Khokhars who dominated the tract upto the Salt Ranges. Before departing from the area, Chingez sent envoys to Iltutmish, the sultan at Delhi, that he (Chingez) had given up the project of sending his army to Hindustan and returning to China by way of Gilgit or Assam, since he had not received favourable omens from burning sheep-skins. It suggests that Chingez had contemplated the invasion of north India, but gave up the idea, either because of Iltutmish's refusal to help prince Jalaluddin, or because of a rebellion in Turkistan, which needed the attention of Chingez. It is easy to imagine what would have happened to the cities of north India if Chingez had decided to invade the country.

After the death of Chingez, the Mongols were for some time too busy in their internal affairs, and in completing the conquest of Khurasan and Iran, to bother about India. But in 1234, Oktai, who had succeeded Chingez Khan in Turkistan (also called Khitai), decided to invade Hind and Kashmir. Iltutmish advanced upto Bunyan in the Salt Ranges to counter this threat. On the way, Iltutmish fell ill, and returned to the capital where he died soon afterwards.

Soon after the death of Iltutmish, the former governor of Ghazni, Wafa Malik, who had been ousted by the Mongols, came to India and captured the entire tract comprising the Koh-i-Jud or the Salt Ranges. This invited Mongol attacks. The Mongols ousted Wafa Malik, and brought the entire Koh-i-Jud under their control. There was a prolonged struggle between Wafa Malik whose dynasty is called the Qarlugh dynasty, and the Mongols for the control of the Koh-i-Jud and Multan, with the sultans of Delhi intervening whenever possible. By 1246, the Qarlughs had to quit India. But by that time, the Koh-i-Jud had become a Mongol bastion, and a base for their further attacks on India.

The seriousness of the Mongol threat had become apparent to the inhabitants of Delhi when in 1240 a Mongol force under Tair Bahadur, who was the commander of Herat, Ghazni and Afghanistan, besieged Lahore. The Turkish governor was ill-prepared to stand a siege, and was further hampered because many of the inhabitants were merchants who regularly traded in the Mongol territories, and were not prepared to aid and help the governor for fear of Mongol reprisals. Also, there was little hope of any help coming from Delhi where there was utter confusion following the death of Razia. Hence, the governor abandoned the city. After

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capturing the city, the Mongols encountered stiff resistance from the citizens and, we are told, 30 to 40,000 Mongols and many of their commanders, including Tair Bahadur, were killed. The Mongols wrecked savage vengeance for this. They killed or enslaved all the citizens of Lahore, and devastated the city. Then they suddenly retreated because the Mongol Qa-an, Ogtai, had died. Although Lahore was reoccupied by Delhi, for the next twenty years Lahore remained in a ruined condition, being sacked on several occasions either by the Mongols or by their Khokhar allies.

It is not necessary for us to follow in detail the recurrent Mongol invasions of the Punjab, Multan and Sindh. It is sufficient to say that the Chaghtai Mongols who controlled Afghanistan were entrenched in the Koh-i-Jud, extended their depredations upto the river Beas which then ran north of the Sutlej, joining the Chenab between Multan and Uchch. This was the situation which faced the sultans of Delhi when Nasiruddin Mahmud ascended the throne in 1246, with Balban becoming the naib soon after. Although Balban wanted to adopt a bold policy, and clear the area upto the Koh-i-Jud from the Mongols, alongwith the Khokhars who were siding with them, little could be done due to the factionalism in the Turkish nobility. Hence, the frontier commanders of Multan and Sindh were left largely to their own devises to cope with the Mongols. In consequence, some of them came to terms with the Mongols, even setting themselves up as independent rulers under Mongol overlordship. Thus, Sher Khan, the cousin of Balban, who had been ousted from Sindh when Balban was displaced by Raihan, repaired to the Mongol chief, Manju Qa-an, apparently to persuade him to invade India in order to restore Sher Khan to his previous position! Nor was Sher Khan the only Turkish officer to do so. But the Mongols had already decided to conquer China, and to concentrate on the conquest of Iraq, Syria and Egypt, leaving it to local commanders to plunder as much as they could in India, on the basis of their own resources. Thus, the sultans of Delhi were lucky not to face the full brunt of Mongol power.

In order to limit the Mongol depredations, Balban adopted both military and diplomatic measures. He sent an envoy to Halaku, the Mongol Il-Khan of Iran, who, apart from the Ogtai-Chaghtai branch which dominated Turkistan and Transoxiana, was the most important figure among the successors of Chingez. Halaku sent a return embassy in 1260 which was given a grand and impressive reception by Balban. Halaku is supposed to have strictly ordered his officers not to invade India, under pain of punishment. However, this assurance need not be given too much importance because Halaku's

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energies, then as earlier, had been devoted to the conquest of Iraq, Syria and Egypt. He had suffered a serious set-back in 1260, being defeated by an Egyptian army which had forced the Mongols to retreat from Syria also. Interestingly, at about the same time, an envoy was received from Barka Khan, the head of the Mongol Golden Horde in South Russia, which was the most powerful group among the Mongols and which had deep enemity towards Halaku. In this complex situation, Halaku simultaneously sent his intendents (shuhna) to Sindh and the Koh-i-Jud areas, thus claiming over-lordship over them. Thus, the agreement also implied that the Sultans of Delhi would not try to disturb the Mongols in Sindh and in areas west of Lahore. By the time Balban ascended the throne in 1266, Halaku had died, thereby ending the nebulous agreement and goodwill between the Mongols and the ruler of Delhi. The situation on the ground had not,however, changed. Although Balban's cousin, Sher Khan, who was the warden of the marches, holding the iqtas of Lahore, Sunam, Dipalpur etc. acted as a shield against the Mongols, the Mongols were able frequently to cross the Beas. At the outset, Balban adopted a forward policy. After clearing the roads in the doab, he marched his army towards Koh-i-Jud. He ravaged the mountainous tract and its neighbouring areas, and captured large number of horses, leading to a sharp decline in the price of horses in Delhi. In 1270, he ordered the fort of Lahore to be rebuilt, and appointed architects to rebuild the city. However, soon afterwards, Balban had Sher Khan, whom he suspected of harbouring dreams of independence, to be poisoned. He then entrusted the defence of the frontier tracts to his eldest son, Prince Muhammad. Prince Muhammad was an able and energetic prince, and it appears that during the remaining years of Balban's reign, while the Mongol attacks continued, his defensive arrangements at Multan and Lahore, with the river Beas as the line of military defence, continued to hold. Barani says that the Mongols no longer dared to attack across the Beas, and that even Mongol forces of 70 to 80,000 sawars could not face the forces of Prince Muhammad from Multan, Bughra Khan from Samana, and Malik Barbak Bakatarse from Delhi. The death of Prince Muhammad outside Multan in 1285 was the outcome of a chance encounter, the prince being surprised by an advance party of the Mongols. However, rather than seeking safety in flight, he preferred to stand and die.

The death of the prince was a heavy personal blow to Balban who had designated the prince as his successor. But it did not change the ground realities as far as the Mongols were concerned.

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The last Mongol attack under Balban's successors was in 1288 when Tamar Khan ravaged the country from Lahore to Multan. But the Mongols retreated as soon as they heard of the arrival of the imperial forces.

Thus, upto 1290, the Mongols dominated western Punjab, the effective frontier being the river Beas. They also continually threatened Multan and Sindh. But they did not mount any serious offensive towards Delhi. This enabled the sultanat of Delhi to survive, but only at the cost of the utmost vigilance and military preparedness.

A last invasion of India by the Mongol branch settled in Iran took place in 1192 when a Mongol army of 150,000 headed by Abdullah, a grandson of Halaku, the Ilkhan of Iran, invaded India. Jalaluddin Khalji who had just succeeded to the throne had spent a considerable part of his life in fighting the Mongols. Jalaluddin Khalji advanced with a large force. After some skirmishes, the Mongols agreed to withdraw without a fight. It seems that there was some kind of an agreement between the two. Jalaluddin had a cordial meeting with Abdullah whom he called his son, and a party of the Mongols, headed by Ulaghu, another grandson of Halaku, embraced Islam, along with 4000 of his followers. They were allowed to settle down near Delhi along with their families. The Sultan married one of his daughters to Ulaghu. These, and a band of 5000 Mongols who had entered India in 1279 became Muslims. They were called "Nau (Neo) Muslims."

These cordial relations suggest that a tacit agreement had been reached between the two sides not to disturb the status quo, leaving the Mongols in possession of West Punjab. However, changes in Mongol domestic politics created a new situation in which the Mongols for the first time posed a serious danger to Delhi.

ii. The Mongol Threat to Delhi (1292-1328)

The rise of the Ogtai-Chaghtai branch of the Mongols which dominated the Mongol homelands including Turkistan led to important changes in the politics of Central Asia. The Mongol chief, Dawa Khan, set out on a course of conflict with the Mongol Qa-an of Iran. Dawa Khan over-ran Afghanistan. He then extended his sway upto the river Ravi.

The first inkling of a new Mongol policy came in 1297-98 when a Mongol army of 100,000 sent by Dawa Khan crossed not only the river Beas, but the river Sutlej, and the road to Delhi seemed

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to lay open before them. Alauddin sent a large army under his trusted commander, Ulugh Khan, who met the Mongols near Jullundhar and completely routed them. About 20,000 Mongols were killed as they fled across the river, and many others, including officers, were captured and done to death at Delhi. This was the most convincing victory which an army of the Sultans of Delhi had gained over the Mongols in a straight fight. A similar victory was gained the following year when the Mongols captured Siwistan in lower Sindh. Zafar Khan, another favourite commander of Alaudin, proceeded against the Mongols. He won a complete victory, capturing the port city, and bringing the Mongol commander, Saldi, in chains to Delhi.

These victories seem to have lulled Alauddin to a false sense of security as regard the Mongols. That is why he was caught unprepared when towards the end of 1299 a force of 200,000 Mongols invaded India, headed by Qutlugh Khan, the son of the Mongol ruler, Dawa Khan. The number of the Mongol soldiers may have been exaggerated, and possibly included women and children who, unlike the times of Chingez, had begun to accompany the Mongol armies. Unlike the previous times, the Mongols did not ravage the countryside or the towns on the way, their objective being to conquer and rule Delhi. Hearing of their approach, Alauddin quickly gathered an army, and took a position outside Siri, the place where he had taken residence before entering Delhi, after murdering his uncle, Jalaluddin. The Mongols entrenched themselves at Killi, six miles north of Delhi. While the two armies faced each other, Alauddin sent urgent summons to the nobles of the doab to hasten to his side with their armies. Meanwhile, many people from the environs took shelter at Delhi which became extremely crowded, and provisions became dear since the caravans of food from the doab had stopped coming.

In this situation, Alaul Mulk, the kotwal of Delhi, advised Alauddin to play a waiting game, and if possible, induce the Mongols to retire peacefully since his army consisted largely of the Hindustani soldiers who had only fought Hindus, and were not used to fighting the Mongols, and were not familiar with their tactics of feigned retreat and ambush. Alauddin rejected the kotwal's advise as being unmanly, and one which would undermine his prestige as a ruler. However, he had no intention of letting everything be decided on the outcome of one battle. Considering that time was on his side, and the Mongols, far away from their homelands, might soon fall short of provisions, Alauddin issued strict instructions to his officers, on pain of death, to stand on guard, and not to go

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out of their lines to attack the Mongols without his orders. However, Zafar Khan, who was itching for a fight, attacked the Mongol contingent facing him. As usual, the Mongols feigned retreat, and when Zafar Khan had gone out several miles pursuing them, an ambush party of 10,000 horses cut off his retreat, and surrounded him. According to Alauddin's orders, the rest of the army did not move out to rescue Zafar Khan who, alongwith all of his followers, died fighting bravely.

Although the Mongols won an initial victory, the firmness of Zafar Khan seems to have made an impression. Qutlugh Khan realized that he could not break Alauddin's lines, or capture Delhi. Hence, after skirmishing for two days, he retreated from Delhi and, moving rapidly, recrossed the Indus. Alauddin did not try to pursue him.

This full-scale Mongol attack on Delhi was a severe shock not only to the citizens of Delhi, but to Alauddin. He now awoke from his sleep of neglect, and undertook far-reaching measures. A protecting wall around Delhi was built for the first time, and all the old forts on the route of the Mongols repaired. Strong military contingents were posted at Samana and Dipalpur. Simultaneously, he took steps to reorganise the internal administration, and to recruit a large army. These measures, which we shall discuss separately, enabled Alauddin to meet the Mongol challenge, even though the Mongol threat to Delhi loomed over India for several more years.



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